The man in the trench cared not how his food arrived, only that it did. The gunner cared only that his shells arrived, though probably less about his shells than his food. The Generals and the War Office in London cared not for the day to day working of the Supply Line, any more than the Board of Directors of a modern supermarket. Only when it failed to deliver did the largest Corps in the British Army become visible during the Great War of 1914-18. So long as it worked it remained invisible to all.

“Pending the improvement of railway and road communications, no further advance will take place after completion of moves on the 20th instant….. The army has now been functioning in the Supply System and, perhaps has realized some of the difficulties which we have had to combat with".¹

Comments recorded by Lt Col EH Blamey, IX Corps, Senior Mechanical Transport Officer [SMTO].² Comments that begged further investigation, particularly as the Line of Communication [LoC]³ had been undergoing a two-year transformation to improve efficiency, not stop the army in its tracks. What transpired was stories of superhuman endurance, inter-service rivalries and conflict between military and civilian perspectives.

Blamey arrived in France with the Army Service Corps [ASC]⁴ on 21 September 1914. In February 1917 he was promoted to IX Corps SMTO. His comments need taking in the context of war diaries being a narrow perspective of a commanding officer [CO] too busy to be interested in adjacent theatres. Just as the man in the trench had no interest in how his meal arrived, the ASC had no practical interest in how anything arrived at railhead. That did not mean they were afraid of criticising others or were immune from inter-service rivalry.

The LoC comprised standard gauge railway from the port of entry to the Supply Railhead,⁵ where supplies were transferred to Divisional Supply Columns [DSC].⁶ These conveyed supplies by road to Refilling Points⁷ using Mechanical Transport [MT]⁸ from where the Divisional Train⁹ delivered to frontline troops using horse transport [HT]. The French owned and operated railways were responsible for the line up to railhead and the ASC from railhead to frontline. Both were independent of each other while being inextricably dependent on each other.

The ASC was responsible for feeding 164,000 men and 27,500 animals in 1914. By the Armistice, the feeding strength was 5,363,352 men and 845,770 animals in all theatres, of which 2,360,400 men and 404,000 animals were in France.¹⁰

On the eve of war, ASC strength was 6,431 men, comprising 498 regular officers and 5,933 other ranks. At the Armistice, the strength was 325,888, comprising 10,547 officers and 315,334 other ranks. A further 82,638 men had been transferred to the infantry, artillery and machine gun corps with 686 officers and 15,547 men killed in action.¹¹ 

In August 1914 ASC MT comprised only eighty lorries, twenty cars and fifteen motorcycles. Lorries registered under the Subsidy Scheme¹² increased the total to 900. 900 was the Army Council’s requirement to mobilise the BEF in 1911, which remained unchanged until 1914.¹³ The army wanted 900 and the Treasury was not going to pay for 901. Subsidised and requisitioned vehicles meant that 1,061 lorries, 193 cars and eleven motorcycles were mobilised.

By 11 November 1918, MT in all theatres had grown to 121,702 motorised vehicles of all types. There were twenty ASC MT Coys in 1914, increased to 605 by 1918 and, whilst this article will concentrate on MT, it cannot be forgotten that HT companies also increased from forty to 552.¹⁴

It is necessary to consider that the expansion was achieved despite a constant dearth of assets, whether vehicle, petrol, spare parts or skilled tradesmen. Not all the original MT companies had any vehicles. They were classified as MT because their personnel had received at least basic MT training.

62 Coy ASC (2 Division Ammunition Park) [AP]¹⁵ personnel, without any transport, arrived by rail at Avonmouth on Mobilisation Day. It received seventy-one impressed lorries of which 26% were unfit for service overseas and left behind when the company sailed for Rouen. On arrival at Amiens Advanced Base on 8 August, 39% were unserviceable.¹⁶ War Office [WO] correspondence dated 3 September 1914 reveals that available lorries suitable for impressment had reduced to twenty per week and output of new lorries was only 100. Also

“It appears to be certain that great difficulty will be experienced in obtaining suitable officers for what is really technical work requiring considerable experience and knowledge of movements of troops.”¹⁷ 

Brig WGB Boyce, Director of Transport, [DT]¹⁸ Saint-Omer, France recorded on 6 December 1914 that twenty-three MT, forty-four HT and twenty-one Supply Officers were to return home to England for training new units. They were the only officers with experience away from the training ground or classroom.¹⁹

No part of the British Expeditionary Force [BEF] was immune from the lack of skilled men. Equally, industry lost a skilled workforce as men enlisted to be unskilled soldiers. It was the inevitable result of the mass recruitment of volunteers necessary to fuel the expansion of the BEF in France. Unskilled labour could march down a road to the front but driving motor lorries or looking after a team of horses was skilled work. The ASC inevitably suffered more from the lack of skilled men than the infantry.

By September 1915, MT drivers were returning home as mentors to newly qualified drivers.²⁰ Home MT Units were used as finishing schools for new drivers before they went overseas and the speed of training, with subsequent lower standard, was having a detrimental impact on efficiency in France.

ASC growth followed the expansion of the armies. New companies were formed piecemeal and allocated as DSCs, Ammunition Sub Parks [ASP]²¹ and Motor Ambulance Convoys [MAC]²² when new vehicles and personnel became available. It was 1917 before a more holistic view was taken and reorganising the LoC commenced.

The first record of the reorganisation found to date is 15 September 1916. Col ERO Ludlow, VI Corps Adjutant, mentions a letter from GHQ requesting comments on a proposal that MT be placed under corps, not divisional, control.²³

At the same time, Eric Geddes²⁴ (later Sir Eric Geddes) was conducting his review of transport in France. He had been sent to France in August 1916 with the remit detailed in correspondence between David Lloyd George and General Haig. Lloyd George wrote on 1 August 1916.

“The problem of developing our transport facilities in order both to accelerate and to augment the despatch of stores is one that is giving me some anxiety. The output at home of munitions has now so greatly increased, that we can meet with comparative ease the higher demands which you quite properly make on us, but I doubt whether, without careful preparation, the powers of absorption of the ports and lines of communication can expand to a commensurate degree. What I have specially in mind is the desirability of ensuring such expansion as will next year, and the year after if necessary, enable us to cope with the ever-increasing volume of munitions and stores which will be needed for the service of your force. I realise some of the difficulties but I think it would perhaps help us if an examination of the transport arrangements in connection with the British Expeditionary Force in this country and overseas were undertaken by an expert investigator. I have accordingly arranged with the Quartermaster-General that Eric Geddes, who has had very special experience of this subject, should look into the question of road, railway, canal, dock and other means of communication.”²⁵ 

Haig responded

“As regards the enquiry into our transport arrangements by Eric Geddes, you will, I am sure realise that everyone behind the army, no less than those at the front is working at such high pressure at present that they will not be able to devote as much time to him as we should like.”²⁶ 

On 16 August, Lloyd George again wrote to Haig regarding Geddes’ investigation.

“There are three points in particular which I would like him to talk over with you. One is the question of Transport facilities for the very considerably increased quantity of ammunition and other stores which we are expecting to send you.

Another is the difficulty which has arisen over the great shortage of petrol. I am really afraid that unless we are able to effect some economy in petrol, we shall be faced with the stoppage or curtailment of the motor bus services, which the working classes are so largely dependent upon.

The third is the question of repair and working of ports, railways, canals and roads in the case of an advance, having regard to the difficulties as to men and materials in this country.”²⁷ 

Haig was fully engrossed with the Battle of the Somme. The army was struggling to maintain ammunition and supplies. Looking forward to the next week was impossible, let alone into the following year, as Lloyd George was able to do. Lloyd George realised that a holistic transport system would be required if it was to cope with the planned escalation of munitions production. His concerns regarding petrol consumption were reinforced when the War Cabinet was informed that the country’s reserve stocks of petrol on 13 January 1917 were 26,000,000 gallons, reduced from 37,500,000 on 9 December. Unless consumption was reduced the reserves would be totally depleted by Easter.²⁸

Lloyd George was also aware of the looming perilous financial position that Haig would have no, or at best very little, knowledge of. On 24 October 1916, Reginald McKenna, Chancellor of the Exchequer, reported on the financial position with America.²⁹ Expenditure between May and September 1916 had been estimated as $795,000,000 (£167,016,807 [£10,113,431,129 in 2025])³⁰ but was actually $985,000,000 [£12,530,477,536].

Committed expenditure in America to March 1917 was $1,250,000,000 [£15,901,621,245]. This did not include the Ministry of Munitions orders yet to be finalised. JP Morgan Bank was tasked with raising $1,500,000,000 [£19,081,945,470] by the end of March 1917. JP Morgan’s New York office responded on 10 October.

“The money required is more than, or as much as exists.”³¹ 

It is evident that the escalating cost of the war had to be brought under control, yet the proposed further industrialisation, promised the opposite. With the front line largely static, it was possible to run the railways along civilian principles with fixed railheads and timetable. Geddes’ experience made him perfect for the role and on 10 October 1916, he was appointed as Director-General of Transportation [DGT] with the British Armies in France and Belgium, with the honorary rank of Major-General. He needed a rank of sufficient seniority to communicate on level terms with GHQ senior officers. The post had responsibility for the supply line from the port of entry to railheads and light railway [LR] termini, including inland waterways. The army remained responsible for movements in front of the railway.

Central to the Geddes reorganisation was extending the rail network, particularly the use of LR. LR was quicker to lay than building new roads and saved road material that was constantly in short supply. In March 1917, the need for sufficient roadstone was the subject of a conference attended by the Fifth Army Deputy Assistant Director of Transport [DADT]³². Here it was considered which roads were to be maintained, allowed to fall into disuse or be taken up to provide road material for the repair of more important routes.³³ 

LR was crucial in shortening the distance lorries travelled between railhead and refilling point. This was important as all MT was overworked with increasing numbers unserviceable for want of spare parts. Raw materials for transport had never been a WO priority and Halley Motors Ltd’s wartime contracts provide insight into WO priorities.

The Glasgow Company produced a respectable ten lorry and bus chassis per week prior to August 1914, when the entire production was taken over by the WO. Difficulty obtaining raw materials and losing skilled men to the war effort, reduced production to ten chassis per month. In May 1916, all lorry production was stopped, despite MT being desperately needed, and a contract for 110,000 shells was awarded at the rate of 4,000 per week.³⁴ 

To facilitate this, the WO built a factory extension at the cost of £85,000 [£6,453,592]³⁵. The WO found the resources to increase munitions production while prepared to sacrifice the means to move that production.

Authority to reorganise the MT Units in France was given by WO letter (121/France/147 S.D.2), on 5 January 1917. It was anticipated that each corps would save 200 artificers, 680 rank and file, 160 lorries, twenty workshops and twenty store lorries.³⁶

Lt Col GH Harvey, XV Corps, SMTO, provides insight into the reorganisation, which unusually pre-dates his appointment as SMTO on 1 February 1917 when the new office was opened.³⁷ In August 1916 he was CO of XV Corps ASP. At the end of August, he was appointed ‘Officer Commanding Mechanical Transport’ within the Corps. This role became necessary as so many extraneous duties had become urgent, that a central power was needed to control the use of MT within the Corps.

The diary, which takes the form of a history, not daily record, describes the reorganisation and role of the SMTO.

“On 1 February 1917 the Mechanical Transport of the XV Corps was reorganised and put on a Corps basis as follows:

Headquarters

“P” Corps Supply Column “P” Corps Ammunition Park “P” Siege Artillery Park.

All the three units were distinguished by the prefix “P” and were not necessarily part of the XV Corps.

The duties of the various officers were never clearly defined, but were taken to be as follows;

The SMTO had three separate functions;

1 - With the Deputy Adjutant-General’s Office at Base he dealt with reinforcements, hence he received and passed the weekly AFB 213A, noted and monitored the surpluses and deficiencies and adjusted them as far as possible.

2 – With the Deputy Director of Supplies & Transport, Fourth Army he acted as Assistant Director of Mechanical Transport, answering all questions on MT.

3 – With HQ XV Corps he acted as a Brigadier-General, dealing with each formation as a battalion. He noted such lorries as were not wanted for their normal supply or ammunition work and detailed them for extraneous duties.

The officers commanding the “P” Supply Column, “P” Ammunition Park and “P” Siege Ammunition Park also had three functions; dealing with the SMTO as regards all matters of MT, dealing with Corps HQ to relieve Corps “Q” of much of the supply work and with the Corps “A” on matters of discipline as a Battalion Commander of Troops.”³⁸

Administration of ASC MT companies was removed from Divisional control and centralised under Corps, creating the post of SMTO. Promoted from commanding an ASP the SMTO had an unenviable workload. VIII Corps SMTO reported to the Corps Deputy Adjutant & Quartermaster-General [A&QMG] in May 1917 that he had forty MT Units under his command and averaged 200 letters per day.³⁹

DSCs and APs thus came under direct orders of the Corps. Bringing all the units under one administration allowed War Establishments [WE]⁴⁰ to be reduced. Vehicles that became surplus to WE were used to create ‘letter’ units, intended as Corps Reserve Units [CRU].⁴¹ Creating CRUs ensured that MT surplus to establishment was retained by the corps. Reorganising was taking place within the wider rationalising of the armies on the Western Front.

The savings refer to assets, with no interest in the financial. There is no reason why troops in France would be aware of the workings of the Treasury in London. Fewer lorries released drivers for the infantry, required less parking space, spare parts, petrol, etc. ASC records always cast doubt as to whether there was room for any reduction, but the effect was to focus minds to maximise the use of available resources. It would be remarkable if any organisation applauded any reduction in assets and the ASC were no exception.

Reality was that supply of new MT from home had almost dried up. The DT had advised QMG on 2 February 1917 that the reserve was being used quicker than it could be replenished. No spare parts had arrived in France for three weeks, increasing the number of unserviceable MT.⁴² The WO therefore determined that the WE of every MT company, except the omnibus companies and MACs, had to be reduced.

On 1 February 1917, 44% of XV Corps lorries were unserviceable.⁴³ On 10 February, Fourth Army’s unserviceable vehicle situation was: ANZAC Corps - 217 unserviceable from 560 (39%); III Corps - 132 from 665 (20%); XIV Corps - 255 from 662 (39%) and XV Corps - 231 from 608 (38%).⁴⁴ The WE for MT companies allowed for 25% spare lorries to replace any in workshops. Only III Corps were using less than their 25% spare and were able to operate at full strength.

To quote the diary

“This was due to several reasons, but chiefly because MT was doing work for which it was never made, was given no rest for timely repairs, had no opportunity for making good the ravages of 1916 and was generally considered a slave to be used at will, ill-treated and parked anywhere.”⁴⁵

By the end of February, the DT felt obliged to inform QMG that the BEF’s overworking of lorries meant there were 990 in unit workshops and, despite knowing lorries from England were in short supply, 680 were needed immediately to replace derelicts.⁴⁶ 990 is equivalent to an entire corps being without MT and reliant on HT.

Lt Col WT Hollins, XVII Corps, SMTO illustrates the problems faced by their MT in March 1917 when operating between Saint-Pol-sur-Ternois and Arras. The state of the roads caused a 4-mph speed limit to be imposed which was half the normal limit. It forced Hollins to request that lorries be used with only one driver so the second could rest. Lorries were working for thirty-six hours without breaks and drivers needed rest.⁴⁷ It should be noted that while Hollins was keen to emphasise the overworking of MT, he made no mention of the harshest weather conditions for decades as the cause of the poor road conditions.

At the beginning of March, a conference of Corps and Divisional HQs was convened to determine a method for making the new transport work. It was decided that all demands for lorries must be made by 8.00pm the previous day. Previously, it had been impossible to plan MT as demands were made often as late as 2.30am on the day needed. The new deadline did not solve the issue of lorries standing at railheads for hours when needed elsewhere. Nor did it address the lack of available of MT.⁴⁸

The reduction in WE and the additional work demanded by the army was creating a perfect storm. Lt Col RW Courtney, VII Corps, SMTO, in the same area as XVII Corps reported the overworking of lorries to headquarters in a memorandum on 17 March.

“I beg to bring to notice the fact that the MT is being, at present, seriously overworked, and, should it continue, the breakdown of the MT is only a matter of time. The chief cause of this overwork is the fact that after lorries have carried out their normal work and returned to Park, they are ordered out again at once for stone carrying, coal, etc, which results in the lorries being out all or nearly all night, and again having to do their normal work early next morning.

During the past week, 252 lorries have been continuously on the road for over 40 hours at a stretch. The great majority of the remainder average between 12 and 18 hours. This discloses a state of things which neither personnel nor vehicles can stand, particularly over these bad roads, and I am anxious to make it clear that necessary work which may shortly be expected will be seriously interfered with unless more care is exercised at this juncture and a considerable reduction made in the work of the MT.”⁴⁹

Throughout March, trains were either late, often by as much as twenty-four hours, or did not arrive at all. On 17 March, XVII Corps lorries waited eighteen hours for a supply train at Aubigny-en-Artois. On arrival it was 2,000 gallons of petrol, in 2-gallon tins, and 2,000 men’s rations short.⁵⁰ The lorries had to travel fifteen miles, taking some three hours, to collect the shortfall at Frevent. At least six hours plus the loading time further added to the shift, already extended by eighteen hours at Aubigny. Equally important, a column of lorries had stood idle when desperately needed elsewhere.

Such was the deterioration in the general transport situation in Third Army, that a conference was convened on 23 March at Frevent Station. Gen Dawkins, Deputy Quartermaster-General, HQ presided and others present were Gen Sillem, Deputy Adjutant & Quartermaster-General [DA&QMG], Third Army Deputy Director Supplies & Transport [DDS&T], VI, VII, XVII and XVIII Corps SMTOs, Adjutant XIX Corps MT, Third Army Deputy Assistant Director Railway Traffic [DADRT], the Army Roads Officer and various Railway Transport Officers and Corps Roads Officers.

The conference concluded that

“The chief difficulties seem to centre on Railway Traffic which resulted in Trains being most uncertain and transport accordingly wasted, in waiting for them.”⁵¹

After the conference, the DT toured railheads in the Third Army area. He concluded that MT at every one was being worked to breaking point and was content to blame poor planning and reliability of the railways. A census revealed that of the 299 spare lorries permitted under Third Army’s WE, 658 were unserviceable. Third Army had overworked its MT to the point where it was unable to move, either in advance or retreat.⁵² It has already been seen that Fourth Army were in the same situation. The census highlighted the need for a centralised system to operate MT by equalising workloads between units. Lt Col EF Blakeney, VI Corps, SMTO felt compelled to write to Corps HQ to explain in more detail his diary for March 1917.

“To show the impossibility of efficiently working MT, owing to the unpunctuality and unreliability, day after day, of the train service at all Railheads. I give a resume of a few notes made this afternoon at a visit to Maroeuil.

Warning from VI Corps to get in touch with RSO.⁵³ 

I telephoned you that no lorries were available, and received authority to take from those reserved for ammunition.

Telegram from 12 Division that Oats and Iron Rations had arrived at Maroeuil and similar messages from 3, 15 and 37 Divisions giving times that evening for clearing trains. (Received at 7.00pm).

Tried to verify times with RTO⁵⁴ but could not get through.

Detailed CAP [Corps AP] to send off its 44 lorries at once, allowing 11 for each Division. (These lorries had been ordered to be taken off Ammunition work as early as possible, and to ‘stand by’ for further orders).

The train at last arrived (at 1.00pm the following day) and the 44 lorries (which had been waiting all night 27/28^th and all the morning of to-day), commenced to load up. The RSO, Maroeuil had no authority for the lorries to enter Arras by daylight, so the journeys to Duisans and Wanquetin (with oats) were done first, leaving the Iron Rations to be taken to Arras this evening.

The result of all this is that 44 lorries were taken off urgent ammunition work yesterday, and hurriedly sent to Maroeuil, whence they will not return to Park till tomorrow morning (an absence of some 36 hours). They had only single drivers, who had completed long hours on ammunition work before being diverted to Maroeuil.

When cases like this are added to the daily delays in ammunition, stone and coal trains it will be seen that MT cannot justify itself as to the loads conveyed in proportion to the time taken and mileage done, that the vehicles do not get the supervision they should, (hence the abnormal number in the Corps, immobile at the moment, i.e. about 195) and the officers and men needlessly exhausted and rendered less efficient.”⁵⁵

What appears as a catalogue of catastrophes should be considered in the context of the scale of reorganisation that coincided with the harshest winter for decades. Twenty degrees of frost had been regularly recorded overnight and twenty-six degrees of frost recorded on 4 February.⁵⁶ On promotion to SMTO, Blakeney was instantly in command of the entire Corps transport comprising five DSCs and four ASPs. Previously commanding a single unit, it must have been daunting. He would naturally be keen to emphasise other’s failings and divert criticism away from his own ability to manage the extra burden of command. He failed to mention the depth of frost, that half his lorries needed two hours to start and that icy roads made predicting journey times impossible. It was, however, fair to criticise the railways for being delayed by the exact same conditions!